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THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC SHUTDOWN 
AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: WHY COURTS 
SHOULD REFOCUS THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
TAKINGS ANALYSIS 
Timothy M. Harris*
           The 2020 Coronavirus Pandemic and the ensuing shutdown of 
private businesses—to promote the public’s health and safety—
demonstrated the wide reach of state and local governments’ police 
power. Many businesses closed and many went bankrupt as various 
government programs failed to keep their enterprises afloat. 
           These businesses were shut down to further the national interest 
in stemming a global pandemic. This is an archetypal example of 
regulating for the public health—preventing a direct threat that sickened 
hundreds of thousands of Americans. But some businesses were 
disproportionately hit while others flourished. Many who bore the brunt 
of these regulations sued, alleging their property was taken by the 
government without just compensation. These unfortunate businesses 
and individuals are unlikely to be successful, absent arbitrary action by 
the government, a physical invasion, or other egregious circumstances. 
           The Takings Clause is therefore woefully inadequate to provide 
what Aristotle called “distributive justice”—the equal distribution of 
benefits and burdens throughout society. Courts should therefore refocus 
the takings analysis to ensure fairness and justice by considering whether 
a regulation has a disproportionate, catastrophic, and sudden impact. 
  
 
 * Adjunct Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. B.A., M.A. University of 
California, Davis. J.D. University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. © 2020. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The 2020 Coronavirus/Covid-19 pandemic shutdown—in which 
state and local governments closed thriving businesses to stem the 
spread of disease—disproportionately affected those business owners 
whose livelihoods depend on human contact. Hair salons, restaurants, 
bars, and movie theaters were shuttered,1 while grocery stores, home 
office suppliers, and technology companies flourished.2 Those human 
contact businesses carried a lopsided societal burden through no fault 
of their own. 
Many affected businesses sued under the Fifth Amendment’s 
Takings Clause: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”3 Although the plain language of the 
Takings Clause would seem to create a viable cause of action, court-
created exceptions for health and safety regulations—coupled with the 
temporary nature of the pandemic shutdown—left these businesses 
without judicial relief. 
The lack of viable takings claims for these disproportionately 
affected businesses highlight the inequities of the Fifth Amendment 
takings analysis. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Takings 
Clause was designed to prevent individuals from bearing burdens, 
“which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.”4 But the cases and judicially-created balancing tests do not 
reflect that outcome. Courts should, therefore, refocus and widen the 
applicability of takings claims to include relief for entities that have 
been suddenly and catastrophically hit by unexpected regulations. 
 
 1. See, e.g., Michael McGough, Coronavirus Updates: In California’s New Reopening Plan, 
When Can Bars, Theaters Reopen?, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 2, 2020, 9:01 AM), https://www.sa
cbee.com/news/coronavirus/article245433100.html (discussing the closing and reopening of bars, 
restaurants, hair salons and card rooms). 
 2. See, e.g., David J. Lynch, In a Bleak Economy, These Companies Are Flourishing, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 11, 2020, 10:40 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/08/10/recessi
on-coronavirus-pandemic-winners/; Mike Duff, Home Office Lifestyle Trends Accelerated as 
Pandemic Spread, HOMEWORLD BUS. (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.homeworldbusiness.com/ho
me-office-lifestyle-trends-accelerated-as-pandemic-spread-2/ 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20201214181237/https://www.homeworldbusiness.com/home-
office-lifestyle-trends-accelerated-as-pandemic-spread-2/] (“The home and small office furniture 
segment is going through a metamorphosis of sorts, one that has been accelerated by the 
coronavirus pandemic in the U.S. . . . .”). 
 3. U.S. CONST. amend V. 
 4. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978) (quoting 
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
In December of 2019, a novel coronavirus began infecting 
humans and quickly spread in Wuhan, China.5 The World Health 
Organization (WHO) declared a global pandemic on March 11, 2020, 
after the virus spread to 114 countries and had killed more than 4,000 
people.6 The first confirmed case in the United States was on 
January 21, 2020.7 The virus subsequently spread across several 
regions of the United States,8 and on January 30, the WHO declared a 
global health emergency.9 The United States reported its first 
coronavirus death on February 29, 2020, and on March 13, President 
Trump declared a National Emergency.10 By March 26, 2020, the 
United States led the world in coronavirus cases.11 The pandemic 
continued through the summer. At the end of September 2020, more 
than two hundred thousand died of coronavirus-related illness in the 
United States, and the total number of cases approached seven 
million.12 
In March of 2020, governors of forty-five states implemented a 
“patchwork of policies,” including full or partial closure of bars, 
restaurants, and other non-essential services in response to the global 
coronavirus pandemic.13 The government’s closure of otherwise 
profitable enterprises created catastrophic losses for many business 
owners and their employees.14 These closures continued for several 
 
 5. Derrick Bryson Taylor, A Timeline of the Coronavirus Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/coronavirus-timeline.html. 
 6. Tedros Adhanom, WHO Dir.-Gen., Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-
19 (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-
remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020/. 
 7. Taylor, supra note 5. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Jeffrey Kluger, Tragic Math: The U.S. Exceeds 200,000 COVID-19 Deaths, TIME 
(Sept. 22, 2020, 11:42 AM), https://time.com/5891101/us-coronavirus-deaths-200000/; Chris 
Kidd, US Death Rate Tops 200,000 as Cases Approach 7 Million, EURO WEEKLY NEWS (Sept. 19, 
2020, 6:23 PM), https://www.euroweeklynews.com/2020/09/19/us-death-rate-tops-200000-as-
cases-approach-7-million/. 
 13. Suzanne Rowan Kelleher, 45 U.S. States Shut Down and Counting: State-by-State Travel 
Restrictions, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/suzannerowankelleher/2020/
03/28/23-states-shut-down-and-counting-state-by-state-travel-restrictions/#54a6d5a358f4. 
 14. See, e.g., Helen Freund, How 6 Months of Pandemic Have Profoundly Changed Florida’s 
Restaurants, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Sept. 20, 2020), https://www.tampabay.com/life-culture/food/ 
2020/09/20/six-months-of-pandemic-have-profoundly-changed-floridas-restaurants/ (stating that 
“[a]cross the country about 100,000 restaurants have either closed permanently or long-term” and 
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months, with phased re-openings in the late summer and early autumn 
of 2020, with mixed success.15 
Several businesses and individuals impacted by this government 
shutdown sued under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In 
Connecticut, a lounge owner alleged that Governor Lamont’s order 
preventing large gatherings and closing restaurants deprived the owner 
of all economically viable use of his property and demanded just 
compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.16 In 
Florida, beachfront property owners alleged that beach patrols by code 
compliance officers constituted a physical invasion because they 
occupy private property and prevent residents from entering their own 
backyards.17 The Florida class-action plaintiffs also argued a 
Fourteenth Amendment due process violation, alleging the beach 
patrol order was arbitrary and capricious.18 
In Colorado, a pro se petitioner, who is a restaurant cook, sued 
because his work ended due to Governor Polis’s coronavirus 
pandemic shutdown, and his free exercise of religion has been 
impaired because gatherings of more than ten people were 
prohibited.19 The petitioner also alleged there is no valid coronavirus 
 
“[c]lose to 3 million employees in the restaurant sector remain out of work”); Josh Mitchell, State 
Shutdowns Have Taken at Least a Quarter of U.S. Economy Offline, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 5, 
2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-coronavirus-shutdowns-have-taken-29-of-u-s-
economy-offline-11586079001 (“At least one-quarter of the U.S. economy has suddenly gone idle 
amid the coronavirus pandemic, an analysis conducted for The Wall Street Journal shows, an 
unprecedented shutdown of commerce that economists say has never occurred on such a wide 
scale.”); Bethany Jean Clement, James Beard Survey Suggests 4 out of 5 Restaurants May Not 
Survive a Prolonged Coronavirus Shutdown—Our Critic on What We Stand to Lose, SEATTLE 
TIMES (May 1, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.seattletimes.com/life/food-drink/4-out-of-5-
restaurants-may-not-reopen-our-restaurant-critic-on-what-we-stand-to-lose/ (“[Restaurant] 
[o]wners report having laid off 91% of hourly workers and nearly 70% of salaried ones.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Chris Woodyard, ‘Makes No Sense’: California Faces Backlash Over Its New 
Tiered System for Reopening Businesses Amid COVID-19, USA TODAY (Sept. 1, 2020, 10:29 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/09/01/coronavirus-california-faces-backlash-
over-new-tiered-reopening-plan/3449500001/. 
 16. Paul Bass, Suit Seeks to Quash Emergency Orders, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Apr. 7, 2020, 
4:08 PM), https://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/ 
covid_lawsuit/. 
 17. See Complaint at 12, Dodero v. Walton Cnty., No. 3:20-cv-05358-RV-HTC, 2020 WL 
1868995 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2020) [hereinafter Dodero Complaint] (“The County and Sheriff’s 
physical appropriation of Plaintiffs’ beachfront properties violates the Plaintiffs’ rights under the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”); see also 
Dodero v. Walton Cnty., No. 3:20cv5358-RV/HTC, 2020 WL 5879130, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 
2020). 
 18. Dodero Complaint, supra note 17, at 15. 
 19. Lawrence v. Colorado, 455 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1065–69 (D. Colo. 2020); see also Calvary 
Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2604–05 (2020) (denying injunctive relief to a 
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emergency and sought an injunction to end the state’s shutdown 
order.20 A federal judge denied the injunctive request due to, inter alia, 
the emergency nature of the orders.21 
In California, attorney Mark Geragos22 sued Governor Gavin 
Newsom for a Fifth Amendment taking, representing, inter alia, a 
Mexican restaurant, a special effects lighting company, a pet groomer, 
and a gondola service.23 Mark Geragos alleged that Governor 
Newsom’s Shelter-in-Place Order violated the constitutionally 
protected rights to travel, due process, and equal protection as well as 
Fifth Amendment takings.24 
In Maryland, housing providers sought an injunction against laws 
that prevented landlords from increasing rents during the pandemic.25 
The petitioners alleged that these laws constituted a regulatory taking 
under both the Federal and Maryland Constitutions.26 The federal 
court denied the request for an injunction because “the appropriate 
remedy for these claims is not equitable in nature.”27 Because money 
damages were adequate, an injunction was inappropriate.28 
In Tennessee, the owners of several restaurants filed for a 
temporary restraining order to prevent Shelby County from enforcing 
a COVID-19 closure order, which required the closure of the 
plaintiffs’ establishments.29 The court denied the motion for injunctive 
 
church that argued it was entitled to meet under the Free Exercise Clause, despite the governor of 
Nevada’s order to the contrary). But see Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 
63 (2020) (granting injunctive relief to religious entities against Governor Cuomo’s capacity limits 
on in-person services). 
 20. Lawrence, 455 F. Supp. 3d at 1066, 1073. 
 21. Id. at 1067. 
 22. Geragos is a celebrity attorney who has represented Michael Jackson, Michael Avenatti, 
Susan McDougal, and several other famous and controversial figures. Richard Winton & James 
Quealley, Caught Up in Avenatti Scandal, Mark Geragos Finds Himself on the Other Side of the 
Law, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2019, 9:20 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-mark-
geragos-profile-20190327-story.html. 
 23. Complaint at 6–8, 19, Gondola Adventures, Inc. v. Newsom, No. 2:20-cv-03789 (C.D. 
Cal. Apr. 24, 2020). 
 24. Id. at 6, 19, 21, 22. 
 25. Willowbrook Apt. Assocs., v. Baltimore, No. SAG-20-1818, 2020 WL 3639991, at *1 (D. 
Md. July 6, 2020). 
 26. Id. at *3. 
 27. Id. at *4; see also Xponential Fitness v. Arizona, No. CV-20-01310-PHX-DJH, 2020 WL 
3971908, at *9 (D. Ariz. July 14, 2020) (“[E]ven if the [Governor’s Executive Order] did violate 
Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment rights, Plaintiffs would not be entitled to injunctive relief because 
damages are the proper remedy for a taking.” (citing Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC v. Hawaii Land Use 
Comm’n, 125 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 1066 (D. Haw. 2015))). 
 28. Willowbrook, 2020 WL 3639991, at *4. 
 29. TJM 64, Inc. v. Harris, 475 F. Supp. 3d 828, 832 (W.D. Tenn. 2020). 
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relief because “Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their 
constitutional claims and given the potential public health 
consequences of allowing Plaintiffs to continue to operate their 
businesses.”30 
In Massachusetts (and several other states), local authorities 
enacted moratoria on evictions.31 Landlords sued seeking to enjoin the 
moratorium but were ultimately unsuccessful.32 In Massachusetts, the 
superior court first rejected the argument that the prohibition on 
ejecting tenants constituted a “physical invasion” by the 
government.33 The court also found that the moratorium did not 
interfere with the plaintiffs’ reasonable investment-backed 
expectations34 and did not, therefore, constitute a taking. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court—in the first published 
appellate case to consider the issue—denied the claims of a 
congressional candidate, a real estate agent, a golf course, and a 
restaurant.35 The parties’ constitutional challenges included a taking 
without compensation under the Fifth Amendment.36 According to the 
court, “the payment of just compensation is not required where the 
regulation of property involves the exercise of the Commonwealth’s 
police power.”37 The outcome was no surprise. 
Under the current state of takings law, arguments in favor of a 
Fifth Amendment Taking by such plaintiffs are unlikely to be 
successful.38 The state-mandated closures are temporary, and were put 
in place to promote the health, safety, and welfare of society, a core 
police power39 and an established background principle of property 
 
 30. Id. at 841. 
 31. Memorandum of Decision and Order on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 
3–5, Matorin v. Massachusetts, No. 2084CV01334 (Aug. 26, 2020). 
 32. Id. at 34. 
 33. Id. at 20. 
 34. Id. at 26. 
 35. Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf, 227 A.3d 872, 876–77 (Pa. 2020). 
 36. Id. at 893. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Bernadette Meyler, Shelter-in-Place Orders Are Perfectly Legal, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/29/opinion/shelter-in-place-constitution.html. 
 39. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824) (stating that police power is “that immense 
mass of legislation, which embraces every thing within the territory of a State, not surrendered to 
the general government”). 
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law. Those regulations also likely kept the early 2020 coronavirus 
pandemic from becoming worse.40 
These health and safety exceptions to otherwise colorable takings 
claims are arguably at odds with the plain language of the Fifth 
Amendment itself and the Supreme Court’s oft-cited admonition that 
the impetus for the Takings Clause is to protect individuals from 
shouldering the burdens that society should bear.41 Unfortunately, the 
coronavirus pandemic shutdown illustrates the inadequacy of takings 
law in distributing burdens among individuals particularly impacted 
by sweeping government shutdowns. 
III.  FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKINGS LAW 
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in part: 
“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”42 Each clause in this sentence has been heavily 
litigated. The focus of this Article is whether private property has been 
“taken” such that just compensation is due under the Fifth 
Amendment.43 “The general rule at least is that while property may be 
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking.”44 This is a maddeningly vague standard for 
litigants. 
Many property and business owners allege that social distancing 
restrictions and the concomitant shutdowns imposed by the 
coronavirus pandemic resulted in their property being “taken” by the 
government such that just compensation is due.45 The bar, however, is 
 
 40. See, e.g., Joel Achenbach, As Social Distancing Shows Signs of Working, What’s Next? 
Crush the Curve, Experts Say, WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2020, 2:11 PM), https://www.washingtonpos
t.com/national/health-science/as-social-distancing-shows-signs-of-working-whats-next-crush-the-
curve-experts-say/2020/04/08/3c720e06-7923-11ea-b6ff-597f170df8f8_story.html. 
 41. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 42. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment applies to the states under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 
239 (1897). 
 43. This Article involves government imposing restrictions (shutdown order) on the 
operations of private entities to restrict gatherings and close personal contact that may further the 
spread of the coronavirus. The property is therefore “private” and the purpose (restricting the spread 
of the disease) is “public.” The amount of “just compensation” is discussed in footnote 45. The 
question addressed by this Article, is whether there is a regulatory “taking” at all. 
 44. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
 45. Just compensation is “fair market value.” United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 
(1943); see also Backus v. Fort St. Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557, 573, 575 (1898) (“[W]hen [the] 
power [of eminent domain] is exercised it can only be done by giving the party whose property is 
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necessarily high for a property owner to prove that “just 
compensation” is due when a regulation restricts use, particularly 
when the justification for the restriction is a public health and safety 
concern. Unfortunately, the test for determining whether a taking has 
occurred is a “muddle,”46 and pandemic-related regulations are likely 
to further the confusion. 
A.  Penn Central’s Ad Hoc Three-Part Balancing Test 
The Fifth Amendment takings analysis begins with the seminal 
taking case, Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York.47 In Penn 
Central, the owners of Grand Central Station (“Station”) in New York 
City sought to partner with UGP Properties (“UGP”) to build a multi-
story office building in the airspace above the Station.48 The proposed 
project complied with all zoning and building requirements,49 but 
because the station had been designated as a landmark under the City’s 
Landmark Preservation Law, UGP and Penn Central were required to 
apply to New York’s Landmark Preservation Committee 
(“Committee”) for the requisite “certificate of ‘appropriateness.’”50 
The Committee denied permission of the plan to cantilever a fifty-five-
story office building over the Station.51 
Penn Central and UGP challenged the Committee’s decision by 
bringing a Fifth Amendment takings claim.52 The U.S. Supreme Court 
 
taken or whose use and enjoyment of such property is interfered with, full and adequate 
compensation, not excessive or exorbitant, but just compensation.”). 
 46. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the 
Roots of the Takings “Muddle”, 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 827 (2006) (“Despite a series of high-
profile decisions over the last three decades, the Supreme Court has failed to solve the riddle it 
posed for itself in the seminal case of the modern regulatory takings era, Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York: When does a regulation burdening property rise to the 
level of a compensable ‘taking’?”). 
 47. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 48. Id. at 116. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 115–17. A certificate of appropriateness will be granted “if the Commission 
concludes—focusing upon aesthetic, historical, and architectural values—that the proposed 
construction won the landmark site would not unduly hinder the protection, enhancement, 
perpetuation, and use of the landmark.” Id. at 112. 
 51. Id. at 116–17. The Commission also rejected a fifty-three-story proposal that involved 
removal of a portion of the Station’s façade. The Commission stated: “To protect a Landmark, one 
does not tear it down. To perpetuate its architectural features, one does not strip them off.” Id. at 
117. 
 52. Id. at 122 (“[T]he issues presented . . . are (1) whether the restrictions imposed by New 
York City’s law upon appellants’ exploitation of the Terminal site effect a ‘taking’ of appellants’ 
property for a public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment . . . . ”). 
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denied the claim, and in doing so articulated a three-part test to 
determine whether a taking has occurred. Accordingly:  
when a regulation impedes the use of property without 
depriving the owner of all economically beneficial use, a 
taking still may be found based on a “complex of factors,” 
including: (1) the economic impact on the regulation on the 
claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered 
with distinct53 investment-backed expectations; and (3) the 
character of the governmental action54  
(the “Penn Central Test”). The Penn Central Test is an “ad hoc 
factual inquir[y], designed to allow careful examination and 
weighing of all the relevant circumstances.”55 
In formulating the Penn Central Test, the Court was guided by 
the principle set forth in Armstrong v. United States56: the “Fifth 
Amendment guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government from 
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness 
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole”57 (the 
“Armstrong Principle”). The Penn Central Court acknowledged there 
has been considerable difficulty in identifying a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment, and articulated the Penn Central Test to set a formula for 
situations where “‘justice and fairness’ require that economic injuries 
caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather 
than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.”58 
The Court rejected Penn Central and UGP’s argument that they 
were solely burdened and unbenefited by New York’s Landmark 
Preservation Law.59 According to the Court, this argument “overlooks 
 
 53. The Supreme Court later changed the word “distinct” to “reasonable” investment backed 
expectations. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979). 
 54. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017); see Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 
124; see also Steven J. Eagle, The Four-Factor Penn Central Regulatory Takings Test, 118 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 601, 601 (2014) (arguing that there is a fourth factor—related to the “relevant parcel”—
in the Penn Central Test); Gary Lawson, et. al., “Oh Lord, Please Don’t Let Me Be 
Misunderstood!”: Rediscovering the Matthews v. Eldridge and Penn Central Frameworks, 81 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 32 (2005) (arguing there are two factors rather than three). 
 55. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1942 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002)). 
 56. 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 
 57. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 123–24 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 
40, 49 (1960)); see also Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1943 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 
617–18 (2001)). 
 58. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124 (emphasis added). 
 59. Id. at 134–36. 
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the fact that the New York City law applies to vast numbers of 
structures in the City in addition to the Terminal.”60 The fact that a 
particular property owner may be more burdened than benefited in a 
particular case does not rise to the level of a taking.61 “[I]n instances 
in which a state tribunal reasonably concluded that ‘the health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare’ would be promoted by prohibiting 
particular contemplated uses of land, this Court has upheld land-use 
regulations that destroyed or adversely affected recognized real 
property interests.”62 
Under Penn Central, the three-part ad hoc balancing test is a 
means to determine whether justice and fairness dictate that a taking 
has occurred, in harmony with the Armstrong Principle. Absent one of 
the exceptions below, a court will apply the Penn Central Test in all 
Fifth Amendment takings cases. Most pandemic shutdown litigants 
will have to show their situation meets the Penn Central Test, which 
is already notoriously difficult.63 
B.  Lucas’s Total Deprivation Test 
The Penn Central Test specifically applies to situations in which 
a regulation did not deprive the property owner of all economically 
viable use of the property.64 That situation was later addressed in 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.65 
In Lucas, a property owner purchased two waterfront lots in 1986 
for $975,000.66 The two lots were surrounded by single-family homes, 
and Lucas’s were the last two vacant lots on the Isle of Palms, in 
Charleston County, South Carolina.67 Two years after Lucas 
 
 60. Id. at 134. 
 61. Id. at 133–35; see, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (the property owner 
was more burdened than benefited by the applicable regulation without the court finding a Fifth 
Amendment taking); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (same); Vill. of Euclid 
v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (same); cf. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 
(1922) (“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be 
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.”). 
 62. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 125. 
 63. A recent study found that less than 10 percent of takings cases are successful under a Penn 
Central analysis. James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 35, 59–60 (2016). 
 64. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 138 n.36 (“The city conceded at oral argument that if 
appellants can demonstrate at some point in the future that circumstances have so changed that the 
Terminal ceases to be ‘economically viable,’ appellants may obtain relief.”). 
 65. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
 66. Id. at 1006. 
 67. Id. at 1009, 1038. 
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purchased the parcels, the state of South Carolina passed the 
Beachfront Management Act that effectively prohibited Lucas from 
building on either of his lots.68 Lucas sued, alleging a taking of his 
property under the Fifth Amendment.69 The Court found a taking and 
articulated a new test, which constituted a per se exception to the three-
part Penn Central Test.70 
Under Lucas, a regulation that “denies all economically beneficial 
or productive use of land” will require compensation under the 
Takings Clause—unless the regulation is consistent with “background 
principles of nuisance and property law.”71 In other words, if a 
regulation eliminates a property’s economic viability, it will 
automatically constitute a taking, unless that regulation is consistent 
with “background principles” of property law.72 This is the first per se 
exception to the three-part Penn Central Test.73 
In Lucas, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the South Carolina 
Supreme Court, which “ruled that when a regulation respecting the use 
of property is designed ‘to prevent serious public harm,’ no 
compensation is owing under the Takings Clause regardless of the 
regulation’s effect on the property’s value,”74 citing to Mugler v. 
Kansas.75 In fact, Lucas did not challenge the assertion that the 
beachfront management act protected a valuable resource or that new 
construction contributed to the erosion of this public resource.76 
According to the Lucas court, however, the Beachfront Management 
Act denied a previously permissible productive use, and did not 
therefore constitute a background principle of property or nuisance 
law that would have exempted the state from providing just 
compensation.77 
Since Lucas, however, courts have been progressively reluctant 
to find a total deprivation of economically viable use. For example, in 
 
 68. Id. at 1007. 
 69. Id. at 1009. 
 70. Id. at 1016. 
 71. Id. at 1016, 1031; see also Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 576 U.S. 350, 361–62 (2015) 
(extending the Lucas “total deprivation” test to a government appropriation of physical property 
such as raisins). 
 72. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031. 
 73. Id at 1031–32. 
 74. Id. at 1010. 
 75. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
 76. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1020. 
 77. Id. at 1031. 
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Leone v. County of Maui,78 the Hawaii Supreme Court held that 
regulations that leave land in its natural state do not always constitute 
a taking,79 clarifying that the Lucas rule is not absolute—and the scope 
of “background principles” is expanding.80 
Many litigants affected by the coronavirus government 
shutdowns may allege that their property (or business) has suffered a 
Lucas-style total deprivation of all economically viable use, but: (1) 
the pandemic government shutdowns are temporary (unlike Lucas) 
and (2) the public health impetus for the pandemic regulations is likely 
more compelling than even the Beachfront Management Act in 
Lucas—as a background principle of property law. Such claims are 
therefore unlikely to be successful under Lucas. 
Mr. Lucas also has a stronger “fairness and justice” argument than 
do the coronavirus litigants. Lucas had two empty lots in a large 
neighborhood of single-family homes and was singled out to bear the 
burden of the Beachfront Management Act, while the coronavirus 
litigants represent wide sectors of business interests.81 Similarly, the 
petitioners in Armstrong itself were a group of government contractors 
whose mechanic’s liens were invalidated by the federal government 
when a shipbuilder went bankrupt.82 Upon the shipbuilder’s 
bankruptcy, title to the ship went to the government under the 
applicable contract, and since liens are prohibited for public work, the 
government had “inchoate title” to the ships.83 The Supreme Court 
held that the liens constituted a property interest that was unlawfully 
“taken” under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.84 
C.  Loretto’s Physical Invasion Test 
Another per se exception to the Penn Central Test is when the 
government physically occupies property. In Loretto v. Teleprompter 
 
 78. 404 P.3d 1257 (Haw. 2017). 
 79. Id. at 1274. 
 80. See Krier & Sterk, supra note 63, at 59–60 tbls. 2–3 (showing a 25.8 percent success rate 
for “total wipeout” cases under Lucas); see also Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas’s 
Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. 
ENV’T L. REV. 321, 368 (2005) (“[J]udicial use of background principles seem likely to expand, as 
government defendants continue to present various categories of Lucas defenses to state and federal 
courts.”). 
 81. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006–07. 
 82. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 41–42 (1960). 
 83. Id. at 42. 
 84. Id. at 43–44. 
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Manhattan CATV Corp.,85 a property owner sued over a city 
regulation that allowed cable companies to install cable equipment on 
buildings.86 
Although the offending cable boxes were only two by four inches, 
along with half-inch wide connecting cable, the Court found that a 
permanent physical invasion authorized by government regulation is 
always a taking. The Court considered a physical invasion of property 
to be a restriction of “an unusually serious character” because it 
“effectively destroys” the right to possess, use, and dispose of the 
property.87 When there is a permanent physical occupation of real 
property, “there is a taking to the extent of the occupation, without 
regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or 
has only minimal economic impact on the owner.”88 
After Loretto, many litigants tried to shoehorn their takings 
claims into physical invasions. For instance, in Yee v. City of 
Escondido,89 a mobile home park owner unsuccessfully claimed that 
a rent control ordinance effected a physical taking.90 More recently, in 
Cedar Point Nursery v. Shiroma,91 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
failed to find a valid taking claim under a Loretto physical invasion 
theory for a regulation that required business owners to open up their 
land to union organizers.92 
Although a coronavirus litigant is unlikely to be able to show a 
true physical invasion, if they could, they would probably have a 
successful takings claim because physical invasions are of an 
“unusually serious character,” and even temporary physical invasions 
are actionable.93 
 
 85. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 86. Id. at 421–22. 
 87. Id. at 426, 435. 
 88. Id. at 434–35 (emphasis added). 
 89. 503 U.S. 519 (1992). 
 90. Id. at 539. 
 91. 923 F.3d 524 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 92. Id. at 532–33 (citing PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980)) (finding 
that requiring a shopping center to be a public forum for speech did not constitute a Fifth 
Amendment taking). On November 13, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Cedar 
Point. See Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, No. 20-107, 2020 WL 6686019 (2020) (mem.). 
 93. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426, 427, 435 fn.12 (“When faced with a constitutional challenge to 
a permanent physical occupation of real property, this Court has invariably found a taking.”). At 
least one coronavirus shutdown petitioner has alleged a physical taking—due to beach patrols that 
cut off access to private property. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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D.  Temporary Takings 
A regulation need not be permanent to constitute a taking, which 
is critical to the analysis of whether coronavirus related government 
shutdown restrictions constitute either a regulatory or physical taking 
under the Fifth Amendment. 
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. 
County of Los Angeles,94 a retreat and recreational center for 
handicapped children in Mill Canyon was destroyed after a fire, and 
subsequent flooding swept the property.95 In response to the flooding 
in the canyon, the County of Los Angeles adopted an ordinance which 
prohibited construction in the interim flood protection area in Mill 
Canyon.96 The church alleged a temporary taking, and the Supreme 
Court stated that “‘temporary’ takings which, as here, deny a 
landowner all use of his property, are not different from permanent 
takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation.”97 
The Court remanded for further proceedings to determine if a taking 
had occurred.98 
On remand, the California court found that there was no Fifth 
Amendment taking and therefore the church was not entitled to 
compensation.99 The court—relying on Mugler—first said that the 
ordinance was justified by health and safety concerns; and second, that 
the church was allowed to use any buildings that were not destroyed 
by flood and it could use the property for any purpose other than 
reconstructing demolished buildings or erecting new ones.100 There 
was therefore no temporary taking for the church under either Lucas 
or Penn Central.101 
The temporary takings analysis, however, should also be 
analyzed in light of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency,102 which considered whether a thirty-two-
month moratorium on development constituted a Fifth Amendment 
 
 94. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
 95. Id. at 307. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 318. 
 98. Id. at 322. 
 99. First Eng. Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. 
Rptr. 893, 905–06 (Ct. App. 1989). 
 100. Id. at 899. 
 101. Id. at 906. 
 102. 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
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taking.103 The plaintiffs in Tahoe-Sierra alleged a Lucas-style per se 
taking due to a prohibition on all development in the lake Tahoe region 
that was subject to the Planning Agency’s jurisdiction.104 The Court 
held that there was no per se taking based on the denominator or 
“parcel as a whole” concept.105 According to the Court, the ability to 
develop a parcel for thirty-two months was only part of a landowner’s 
rights because: 
Both dimensions must be considered if the interest is to be 
viewed in its entirety. Hence, a permanent deprivation of the 
owner’s use of the entire area is a taking of “the parcel as a 
whole,” whereas a temporary restriction that merely causes a 
diminution in value is not. Logically, a fee simple estate 
cannot be rendered valueless by a temporary prohibition on 
economic use, because the property will recover value as 
soon as the prohibition is lifted.106 
Therefore, under Tahoe-Sierra, a temporary taking can never be 
tantamount to a “total deprivation” under Lucas. However, the Court 
left open the possibility of a temporary taking under Penn Central’s 
three-part test107—although meeting that test will be nearly 
impossible.108 
Lower courts have attempted to reconcile Tahoe-Sierra and First 
English by identifying the parameters of myriad temporary takings. 
According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, in Seiber v. United States109: 
Supreme Court cases, as well as decisions from our own 
court, recognize that a temporary taking may arise in one of 
two ways. First, “a temporary taking occurs when what 
would otherwise be a permanent taking is temporally cut 
short.” Temporary takings of this category may result when 
 
 103. Id. at 306. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 331 (“To sever a 32-month segment from the remainder of each fee simple estate 
and then ask whether that segment has been taken in its entirety would ignore Penn Central’s 
admonition to focus on ‘the parcel as a whole.’” (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New 
York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978))). 
 106. Id. at 332. 
 107. Id. at 334 (“[T]he ultimate constitutional question is whether the concepts of ‘fairness and 
justice’ that underlie the Takings Clause will be better served by one of these categorical rules or 
by a Penn Central inquiry into all of the relevant circumstances in particular cases.”). 
 108. Id. 
 109. 364 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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“a court invalidates a regulation” that had previously effected 
a taking, “when the government elects to discontinue 
regulations after a taking has occurred,” or when “the 
government denies a permit . . . [and] at some [later] point 
reconsiders the earlier denial and grants a permit (or revokes 
the permitting requirement).” The “essential element” of this 
type of temporary taking “is a finite start and end to the 
taking,” In the case of a rescinded permit denial, therefore, 
“the initial denial of a permit is still a necessary trigger” for 
the temporary taking. 
Alternatively, a temporary “taking may occur by reason of 
extraordinary delay in [the] governmental decision making” 
process. In such a case, a property owner may be entitled to 
compensation for property loss incurred while the 
government was in the process of deciding whether to allow 
the contested activity. This type of temporary takings claim 
may be asserted “notwithstanding the failure [of the 
government] to deny a permit” or affirmatively prohibit a 
certain use of the property. Nonetheless, “mere fluctuations 
in value during the process of governmental decision 
making, absent extraordinary delay” do not give rise to a 
compensable temporary taking under this second category 
because such losses are considered “incidents of 
ownership.”110 
In other words, to constitute a temporary taking in the coronavirus 
regulation context, the enactment of a “stay in place” regulation may 
constitute a “triggering event,” and if the stay in place regulation were 
stricken down (for example) because it was arbitrary and capricious 
and a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, 
or the Equal Protection Clause, there may be a valid takings claim for 
the period that the invalid “stay in place” regulation was in effect—if 
the landowner was able to prove a taking under Penn Central’s three-
part test.111 There may also be a valid temporary takings claim if there 
 
 110. Id. at 1364–65 (alterations in original) (first quoting Wyatt v. United States, 271 F.3d 1090, 
1097 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2001); then Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (analyzing a Fifth Amendment takings claim over the denial of a permit to harvest timber 
due to the listing of the Spotted Owl under the Endangered Species Act); and then citing Cooley v. 
United States, 324 F.3d 1297, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
 111. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330. 
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is an unreasonable delay or when a government elects to discontinue 
a regulation after a taking has occurred.112 A Lucas-style “total 
deprivation” claim for a temporary taking in the coronavirus 
government shutdown context is precluded by Tahoe Sierra. 
It is also possible to have a temporary taking in the case of a 
Loretto physical invasion of property. In Arkansas Game and Fish 
Commission v. United States,113 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a 
temporary taking was possible for government-induced seasonal 
flooding over the commission’s property.114 The only issue before the 
Court was whether such a claim (a temporary physical invasion) was 
categorically exempt from a Fifth Amendment taking claim, and the 
Court held that it was not.115 However, any such claim would still have 
to meet the three-part Penn Central Test.116 
E.  The Public Health and Safety Exception to Takings Claims 
Both Penn Central and Lucas contemplate some sort of exception 
to the takings analysis for regulations that concern the general health, 
safety and welfare;117 particularly when such concerns produce a 
widespread public benefit and are applicable to “all similarly situated 
 
 112. Seiber, 364 F.3d at 1364. 
 113. 568 U.S. 23 (2012). 
 114. Id. at 27 (arguing there was a permanent taking due to the destruction of trees on the 
flooded property); see Brian T. Hodges, Will Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States 
Provide a Permanent Fix for Temporary Takings?, 41 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 365, 365 (2014) 
(stating that there are no categorical exemptions to liability for government actions that are 
temporary in nature). 
 115. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 568 U.S. at 38 (“We rule today, simply and only, that 
government-induced flooding temporary in duration gains no automatic exemption from Takings 
Clause inspection.”). 
 116. Id. at 39 (noting that under Arkansas Game and Fish, the owner’s reasonable investment-
backed expectations are part of the analysis in determining whether a temporary physical taking is 
compensable). For another viewpoint, see Hodges, supra note 114, at 388–92 (arguing that the test 
is the same for both temporary and permanent physical takings). See Bridge Aina Le’a, LLC v. 
Land Use Comm’n, 950 F.3d 610, 631–33 (9th Cir. 2020) (applying the valuation prong of the 
Penn Central Test to a temporary taking and concluding that the valuation evidence weighs strongly 
against a taking). 
 117. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978) (“More 
importantly for the present case, in instances in which a state tribunal reasonably concluded that 
‘the health, safety, morals, or general welfare’ would be promoted by prohibiting particular 
contemplated uses of land, this Court has upheld land-use regulations that destroyed or adversely 
affected recognized real property interests.”); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1023 
(1992) (finding that Hadacheck, Miller, and Goldblatt “are better understood as resting not on any 
supposed ‘noxious’ quality of the prohibited uses but rather on the ground that the restrictions were 
reasonably related to the implementation of a policy—not unlike historic preservation—expected 
to produce a widespread public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated property” (quoting 
Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 133–34 n.30)). 
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property [owners].”118 Courts have traditionally been deferential 
toward local jurisdictions’ authority to regulate for health and safety 
under the applicable police power.119 Therefore, if the government has 
enacted a valid regulation for the protection of safety, health, and 
welfare, courts will not find a Fifth Amendment taking. 
An analysis of the extent of a state’s authority to regulate health 
and safety without compensation begins with Mugler v. Kansas,120 
cited by both Penn Central121 and Lucas.122 Mugler involved a 
challenge to a Kansas constitutional amendment that prohibited the 
sale and manufacture of liquor.123 When the Kansas constitutional 
amendment passed, all liquor sales and manufacturing were declared 
a common nuisance.124 After Mugler’s brewery was declared a 
nuisance, he claimed “most earnestly and confidently, that his right to 
operate his brewery as vested in him by the laws of Kansas, cannot be 
taken away by the State without just compensation.”125 According to 
the Mugler Court: 
[T]he present case must be governed by principles that do not 
involve the power of eminent domain, in the exercise of 
which property may not be taken for public use without 
 
 118. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1023 (1992) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 133–34 n.30). 
 119. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (stating that the police powers of a state 
“determine, primarily, what measures are appropriate or needful for the protection of the public 
morals, the public health, or the public safety,” subject to constitutional limits); Cal. Reduction Co. 
v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306, 306 (1905) (holding that an ordinance limiting garbage 
burning to certain areas was not a compensable taking under the city’s authority to regulate public 
health); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962) (“If this ordinance is otherwise 
a valid exercise of the town’s police powers, the fact that it deprives the property of its most 
beneficial use does not render it unconstitutional.”); see also id. at 596 (“Our past cases leave no 
doubt that [challengers to police power] had the burden on ‘reasonableness.’” (citing Bibb v. 
Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 529 (1959) (arguing that the exercise of police power is 
presumed to be constitutionally valid))); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 553 (1954) (“The 
presumption of reasonableness is with the State.”); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 
144, 154 (1938) (stating that the exercise of police power will be upheld if “any state of facts either 
known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for it”). 
 120. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 623. 
 121. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 126 (citing Mugler, 123 U.S. at 623) (upholding law that 
prohibited liquor business). 
 122. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1010, 1022–23, 1033 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The South Carolina 
Supreme Court had rejected Lucas’s takings claim based on a Mugler analysis. See id. at 1010 
(“[The South Carolina Supreme Court] ruled that when a regulation respecting the use of property 
is designed to ‘prevent serious public harm,’ . . . no compensation is owing under the Takings 
Clause regardless of the regulation’s effect on the property’s value.”). 
 123. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 624. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 637. 
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compensation. A prohibition simply upon the use of property 
for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be 
injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, 
cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an 
appropriation of property for the public benefit. Such 
legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or use of 
his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to 
dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the State that its use 
by any one, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to 
the public interests. . . . The power which the States have of 
prohibiting such use by individuals of their property, as will 
be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the 
public, is not—and, consistently with the existence and 
safety of organized society, cannot be—burdened with the 
condition that the State must compensate such individual 
owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of 
their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property, 
to inflict injury upon the community.126 
The U.S. Supreme Court therefore rejected Mugler’s argument. In 
doing so, the Court extended tremendous deference to legislative 
authorities in the supervision of public health.127 
Following Mugler, in Miller v. Schoene,128 the U.S. Supreme 
Court denied compensation for a property owner who was forced to 
cut down ornamental red cedar trees by the state entomologist because 
there was a danger of spreading plant disease to a nearby orchard.129 
Miller challenged the state’s decision under a Fourteenth Amendment 
substantive due process theory.130 According to the Court, “the state 
does not exceed its constitutional powers by deciding upon the 
destruction of one class of property in order to save another which, in 
the judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the public.”131 
This determination is at the core of every exercise of police power that 
affects real property.132 
 
 126. Id. at 668–69 (emphasis added). 
 127. Id. at 669 (citing Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879)). 
 128. 276 U.S. 272 (1928). 
 129. Id. at 277. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 279. 
 132. Id. at 279–80; see also Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 414 (1915) (“We must 
accord good faith to the city in the absence of a clear showing to the contrary and an honest exercise 
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In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,133 the U.S. Supreme Court—
also following Mugler—denied compensation for a property owner in 
Hempstead, New York, who operated a gravel mine within the town’s 
limits.134 The town had enacted a new ordinance regulating dredging 
and excavating and subsequently sued a mine owner for failing to 
comply with the new law.135 The mine owners alleged the new law 
prevented them from operating their decades-old business and was an 
unlawful exercise of police power.136 The ordinance prohibited a 
beneficial use to which the property had been put and was arguably 
not even a nuisance.137 The Goldblatt Court upheld the ordinance 
because the interest of the public required it, and the means necessary 
to accomplish the purpose were not unduly burdensome.138 
Regulations enacted by states—mostly by governors139—in 
response to the coronavirus pandemic concern widespread public 
health matters and were largely applicable to all similarly situated land 
(or business) owners. The health, safety, and welfare cases show 
courts will generally defer to legislative and executive authorities in 
their supervision of public health.140 Those determinations, in turn, are 
a valid defense to most Fifth Amendment takings cases. 
In Luke’s Catering Service, LLC v. Cuomo,141 the Federal District 
Court of the Western District of New York stated:  
When faced with a society-threatening epidemic, state 
officials are empowered to implement emergency protective 
measures that infringe federal constitutional rights. They 
 
of judgment upon the circumstances which induced its action.”). Hadacheck involved a challenge 
to the city’s ordinance preventing the manufacture of bricks or operation of a brickyard. Hadacheck 
alleged the ordinance took his property without compensation, it did not create a public offense and 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court rejected his argument, 
deferring to the legislature’s exercise of its police power. Id. at 413. 
 133. 369 U.S. 590 (1962). 
 134. Id. at 591. 
 135. Id. at 592. 
 136. Id. at 590–91. 
 137. Id. at 592. 
 138. Id. at 594–95 (citing Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894)). 
 139. In Washington state, for example, a governor may enact emergency health and safety 
regulations for thirty days. Any extension must be approved by the state legislature. WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 43.06.220(4) (LexisNexis 2020). 
 140. See, e.g., S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613–14 (2020) 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring) (stating that when state officials “undertake[] to act in areas fraught with 
medical and scientific uncertainties,” their latitude “must be especially broad”; and “where those 
broad limits are not exceeded, they should not be subject to second-guessing by an ‘unelected . . . 
judiciary’”). 
 141. No. 20-CV-1086S, 2020 WL 5425008, at *1 (W.D. N.Y. Sept. 10, 2020). 
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may generally do so at their sole discretion and for so long 
as is necessary. And as long as the emergency measures bear 
some real or substantial relation to the threatening epidemic 
and are not unquestionably a plain invasion of rights, the 
efficacy and wisdom of those measures are not subject to 
judicial second-guessing.142  
The Luke’s Catering court denied plaintiffs’ request for an 
injunction under inter alia Fifth Amendment takings and equal 
protection grounds because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate 
“beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights.”143 
IV.  DUE PROCESS/EQUAL PROTECTION 
Opponents to many governor-initiated lockdowns claimed that 
the actions were “arbitrary” and “capricious.”144 These are buzz words 
for a potential Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim, 
which may be applied to executive and legislative abuses of power.145 
Generally, to prove a claim under most coronavirus pandemic 
regulation objections, a claimant would have to show that the 
regulation is not rationally related to a legitimate government 
 
 142. Id. at *1. 
 143. Id. at *6. 
 144. See, e.g., TJM 64, Inc. v. Harris, 475 F. Supp. 3d 828, 833 (W.D. Tenn. 2020) (“Plaintiffs’ 
substantive due process challenge alleges that the COVID-19 Closure Order is ‘capricious, 
irrational, arbitrary and abusive conduct . . . .’”); see also COVID Thursday Update: Petition Urges 
Governor to Lift State of Emergency Order, Outbreak Identified in Concord, CONCORD MONITO
R (Apr. 16, 2020, 12:59 PM), https://www.concordmonitor.com/COVID-updates-Thursday-rally-
to-reopen-New-Hampshire-33919268 (petition urged Governor Sununu to rescind declaration of 
emergency because “[w]e believe the emergency orders issued by Gov. Sununu are arbitrary and 
unbalanced, particularly in determining ‘essential’ and ‘non essential’ organizations and allowing 
people to assemble in the supermarket but not in their place of work or community, which are 
equally susceptible to transmission of the virus”); Molly Beck & Madeline Heim, GOP Leaders 
Seeking to Overturn Tony Evers’ Coronavirus Orders Aren’t Saying What Alternatives They Want, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Apr. 23, 2020, 2:29 PM), https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politic
s/2020/04/23/wisconsin-gop-silent-what-new-coronavirus-rules-should-republican-tony-evers-
gov-democrat-covid-19/3003763001/ (legislators calling for a Department of Health Service Plan 
that is not “arbitrary and capricious”). 
 145. See generally Rosalie Berger Levinson, Reining in Abuses of Executive Power Through 
Substantive Due Process, 60 FLA. L. REV. 519, 519 (2008) (“[I]t is well established that the Due 
Process Clause includes a substantive component that ‘bars certain arbitrary wrongful government 
actions “regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.”’”). 
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objective.146 One way to do this is to show the government action is 
arbitrary and capricious.147 
A substantive due process claim is separate and distinct from the 
takings claim procedures outlined above.148 However, a coronavirus 
pandemic shelter-in-place order that reaches the notoriously difficult 
arbitrary and capricious threshold may, in turn, be a basis for a 
temporary taking for the time that the regulation was in effect. In other 
words, if an emergency order was shown to have no rational relation 
to a legitimate government objective (by showing the regulation is 
arbitrary and capricious), the property or business owner may be able 
to obtain damages for the time that the regulation was in effect and the 
time the regulation was struck down.149 However, the claimant would 
still then have to show that the claimant met the three Penn Central 
 
 146. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 187–88 (1928) (“[A] court should not set 
aside the determination of public officers unless it is clear that their action ‘has no foundation in 
reason and is a mere arbitrary or irrational exercise of power having no substantial relation to the 
public health, the public morals, the public safety or the public welfare in its proper sense.’” 
(quoting Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926))). 
 147. See Cnty. of Butler v. Wolf, No. 2:20-cv-677, 2020 WL 5510690, at *26 (W.D. Pa. 
Sept. 14, 2020) (finding that the government’s orders closing all “non-life-sustaining” businesses 
were arbitrary in creation, scope, and administration—and therefore in violation of substantive due 
process). According to the Butler court, “the right of citizens to support themselves by engaging in 
a chosen occupation is deeply rooted in our nation’s legal and cultural history and has long been 
recognized as a component of the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at *25. 
 148. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 529 (2005). 
 149. Unless the claim relates to a fundamental right or to, inter alia, a suspect class. Although 
a discussion of every potential constitutional right affected is beyond the scope of this Article, other 
claims that the stay-at-home orders are unconstitutional center on First Amendment rights of 
expression and association and free exercise of religion as well as civil liberties and privacy. See, 
e.g., Three Southern California Churches Sue Gov. Newsom Over Coronavirus Orders, L.A. TIMES 
(Apr. 13, 2020, 7:59 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-04-13/three-southern-
california-churches-sue-gov-newsom-over-coronavirus-orders (“[The] churches . . . argu[ed] that 
social distancing orders violate the 1st Amendment right to freedom of religion and assembly.”); 
Kiah Collier et al., Despite Coronavirus Risks, Some Texas Religious Groups Are Worshipping in 
Person—With the Governor’s Blessing, TEX. TRIB. (Apr. 2, 2020, 5:00 PM), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2020/04/02/texas-churches-coronavirus-stay-open/ (“Texas is far 
from the only state to deem religious services essential; more than a dozen others have done so, 
according to the National Governors Association.”). In Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn New 
York v. Cuomo, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a church’s application for an injunction because 
restrictions to church attendance were “not ‘neutral’ and of ‘general applicability’”—such 
restrictions “must satisfy ‘strict scrutiny,’ and this means they must be ‘narrowly tailored’ to serve 
a ‘compelling state interest.’” Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67 
(2020) (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 
(1993)). 
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factors to be compensated for a Fifth Amendment taking. A Lucas-
style total deprivation claim is likely precluded by Tahoe Sierra.150 
Proving such a claim is, in general, going to be wildly unlikely.151 
There is, however, a narrow precedent for striking down regulations 
that fail to advance health and safety laws. In Nectow v. City of 
Cambridge,152 the U.S. Supreme Court examined a zoning regulation 
in terms of the advancement of police powers of the health, safety, and 
general welfare of the inhabitants of the City of Cambridge, 
Massachusetts.153 Nectow was a due process claim case wherein the 
property owner argued that a zoning regulation, as applied, “deprived 
him of his property without due process of law in contravention of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”154 The City of Cambridge had zoned part of 
Nectow’s property as residential, but a special master found that the 
zoning would not promote the “health, safety, convenience, and 
general welfare of . . . that part of the . . . city,”155 because the 
surrounding properties were put to industrial and railroad purposes 
and there “would not be adequate return on the . . . investment for the 
development of the property.”156 The zoning regulation was struck 
down.157 
Nectow is important because it finds that a zoning regulation, as 
applied, failed to advance health and safety regulations and was 
therefore struck down under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, in 
determining whether an executive decision is arbitrary and capricious, 
courts generally set an exceedingly high standard—behavior must 
“shock the conscience” or constitute the “most egregious official 
conduct.”158 This standard will be extraordinarily—but not 
 
 150. Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf, 227 A.3d 872, 895 (Pa. 2020); see also Nat’l 
Amusements Inc. v. Borough of Palmyra, 716 F.3d 57 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding no Fifth Amendment 
taking under Tahoe Sierra for a five-month shutdown of an open-air flea market because of safety 
concerns related to unexploded munitions from a weapons testing facility). 
 151. See generally Joseph D. Richards & Alyssa A. Ruge, Most Unlikely to Succeed: 
Substantive Due Process Claims Against Local Governments Applying Land Use Restrictions, 78 
FLA. BAR J. 34 (2004) (discussing why substantive due process claims against local governments 
applying land use restrictions are typically very unlikely to succeed). 
 152. 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
 153. Id. at 184. 
 154. Id. at 185. 
 155. Id. at 187 (citation omitted). 
 156. Id. (citation omitted). 
 157. Id. at 188–89. 
 158. Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998); Nestor Colon Medina & 
Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 45 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting that the “shocks the conscience” 
standard “[leaves] the door slightly ajar for federal relief [only] in truly horrendous situations”). 
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impossibly—difficult to meet in the coronavirus global pandemic 
government shutdown context. Shutting down restaurants and hair 
salons, for example, has a direct correlation to promoting social 
distancing, which is critical to stop the spread of disease.159 A 
substantive due process claim is therefore unlikely to be successful in 
the coronavirus government shutdown context. 
Similarly, there is little hope for petitioners alleging a procedural 
due process violation. Generally, before a property right is taken, one 
must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before a neutral 
decisionmaker.160 However, “where the State acts to abate an 
emergent threat to public safety, postdeprivation process satisfies the 
Constitution’s procedural due process requirement.”161 A petitioner 
would likely have to show there is no relationship between the 
prohibited activity and the harm sought to be remedied. Further, the 
general right to do business is not recognized as a constitutionally 
protected property right that is subject to due process protection.162 
Some aggrieved plaintiffs have also sought to have coronavirus 
shutdown orders overturned on Equal Protection grounds. “The Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no 
State shall ‘deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly 
situated should be treated alike.”163 Plaintiffs must show disparate 
treatment was based on “impermissible considerations such as race, 
religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, 
or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person.”164 
In Lebanon Valley Auto Racing Corp. v. Cuomo,165 the plaintiffs 
sought to invoke the Equal Protection Clause by showing disparate 
treatment by comparing the government’s treatment of crowds 
attending racetrack events (denied) to crowds attending 
 
 159. See Achenbach, supra note 40. 
 160. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348–49 (1976). 
 161. RBIII, L.P. v. City of San Antonio, 713 F.3d 840, 844 (5th Cir. 2013); see also Gilbert v. 
Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997) (“[W]here a State must act quickly, or where it would be 
impractical to provide predeprivation process, postdeprivation process satisfies the requirements of 
the Due Process Clause.”). 
 162. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675 
(1999). 
 163. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. 
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). 
 164. Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Village of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 499 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting 
LaTrieste Rest. & Cabaret v. Vill. of Port Chester, 40 F.3d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
 165. 478 F. Supp. 389 (N.D.N.Y. 2020). 
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demonstrations and riots (permitted).166 Their appeal for an injunction, 
however, was denied because there must be specific facts to show 
“that the comparators are ‘similar in relevant respects.’”167 According 
to the court, there was insufficient equivalence between private, 
capacity-limited venues on one hand and attendees of public protests 
on the other.168 
Finally, government orders to shut down thriving businesses may 
have been enacted without the requisite constitutional authority. In 
Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm,169 the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
struck down an order issued by the state Department of Health 
Services (DHS) that required closure of all non-essential 
businesses.170 The court found that in enacting the order, the 
Wisconsin DHS was required to follow statutory rule-making 
procedures and failed to do so, and therefore, the penalties for 
noncompliance were invalid;171 and that the DHS exceeded its 
authority under the applicable health regulations.172 
V.  THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC AND GOVERNMENT ACTION 
The government’s forced shutdown of otherwise thriving 
businesses helped control the pandemic and stemmed an otherwise-
catastrophic loss of life.173 
Most states enacted sweeping shutdown and shelter-in-place 
regulations that limited commerce and outdoor activities. In 
Pennsylvania, for example, after declaring a disaster emergency 
Governor Wolf issued an executive order on March 19, 2020, closing 
all businesses that were not life-sustaining.174 Restaurants and bars 
were singled out for closure, although permitted to offer carry out, 
 
 166. Id. at 399. 
 167. Id. at 398 (quoting Lilakos v. New York City, 808 Fed. App’x. 4, 8 (2d Cir. 2020)). 
 168. Id. But see Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2608–10 (2020) 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that allowing casino to operate in Nevada while prohibiting church 
gatherings constituted unlawfully disparate treatment). 
 169. 942 N.W.2d 900 (Wis. 2020). 
 170. Id. at 906, 918 (ordering, inter alia, “‘[a]ll for-profit and non-profit businesses’ to ‘cease 
all activities’ except for minimum operations that Palm deemed basic”). 
 171. Id. at 918. 
 172. See id. (“We further conclude that Palm’s order confining all people to their homes, 
forbidding travel and closing businesses exceeded the statutory authority of Wis. Stat. § 252.02, 
upon which Palm claims to rely.”). 
 173. See Achenbach, supra note 40. 
 174. Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf, 227 A.3d 872, 876–77 (Pa. 2020). 
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drive through, and delivery business.175 These businesses were closed 
expressly to “prevent the spread of COVID-19 by limiting person-to-
person interactions through social distancing.”176 
In Washington, Governor Inslee similarly directed all residents to 
stay at home “except as needed to maintain continuity of operations of 
essential critical infrastructure sectors and additional sectors as the 
State Public Health Officer may designate as critical to protect health 
and well-being of all Washingtonians,” shutting down all non-
essential businesses, including restaurants and bars, who were 
permitted to do take-out business.177 
In California, Governor Newsom declared a State of Emergency 
on March 4, 2020.178 On March 19, 2020, he “order[ed] all individuals 
living in the State of California to stay home or at their place of 
residence except as needed to maintain continuity of operations of the 
federal critical infrastructure sectors.”179 Governor Newsom’s Order 
singled out for closure: dine-in restaurants, bars and nightclubs, 
entertainment venues, gyms and fitness studios, public events and 
gatherings, convention centers, and hair and nail salons.180 The order 
also listed a number of approved outdoor activities.181 In late August, 
the Governor unveiled a new plan to implement phased re-openings 
on a county-by-county basis.182 
 
 175. Id. at 879. The Governor took steps to ensure that similarly situated entities would be 
treated the same by employing a federal classification system of business sectors. 
 176. Id. at 880. 
 177. Proclamation, Stay at Home—Stay Healthy, Proclamation 20-25 by Wash. Governor Jay 
Inslee app. at 1 (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/WA%20Essenti
al%20Critical%20Infrastructure%20Workers%20%28Final%29.pdf. 
 178. Proclamation of a State of Emergency by Cal. Governor Gavin Newsom (Mar. 4, 2020), 
https://www.gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/3.4.20-Coronavirus-SOE-Proclamation.pdf. 
 179. Cal. Exec. Order, Executive Order N-33-20 by Cal. Governor Gavin Newsom (Mar. 19, 
2020), https://covid19.ca.gov/img/Executive-Order-N-33-20.pdf. 
 180. Mary Blyth Jones, Gavin Issues Stay-At-Home Orders for Entire State, COALINGA PRESS 
(Mar. 19, 2020), https://coalingapress.org/2020/03/19/executive-order-n-33-20/. 
 181. See, e.g., Alix Martichoux, California Shelter-in-Place: State Issues Weirdly Specific List 
of Allowed Outdoor Activities, ABC 7 NEWS (May 1, 2020), https://abc7news.com/california-list-
of-outdoor-activities-is-tennis-allowed-in-may-near-me/6143855/. 
 182. See Alexei Koseff & Catherine Ho, California’s New Rule for Coronavirus Reopenings: 
It’s Not All or Nothing, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 31, 2020, 11:10 AM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/p
olitics/article/California-s-new-rules-for-coronavirus-15522578.php (“Under the plan, unveiled 
[Aug. 28, 2020] by Gov. Gavin Newsom, counties will be placed into four color-coded tiers—
purple, red, orange and yellow, in descending order of severity—based on the prevalence of the 
coronavirus in their communities and gradually move through those levels. Restrictions on business 
and public life will be eased as transmission drops.”). 
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In hard-hit New York, Governor Cuomo issued a “New York 
State on Pause” order on March 20, 2020.183 All non-essential 
businesses were closed, and any non-essential gatherings of any size 
for any reason were cancelled or postponed.184 
Some steps were taken to mitigate the harm to hard-hit 
businesses, with mixed success. Congress passed the Coronavirus Aid, 
Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act,185 which, inter alia, 
provided direct payment to individuals, extended unemployment 
benefits, allowed employers to delay paying some taxes, eased 
retirement fund restrictions, and paused student loan interest.186 The 
CARES Act also provided $350 billion to prevent layoffs and small 
business closures during the coronavirus pandemic shutdown.187 The 
small business administration enacted the “paycheck protection 
program”—a sweeping forgivable loan program for small 
businesses.188 
Many jurisdictions enacted legislation prohibiting evictions for 
both residential and commercial tenants.189 However, even in states 
 
 183. Ryan W. Miller & Marco della Cava, Coronavirus Updates: U.S. Infections Approach 
20,000; NY, Illinois Unleash Strict Rules; 150 Detroit Cops Quarantined, USA TODAY (Mar. 20, 
2020, 5:36 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2020/03/20/coronavirus-updates-
us-deaths-cases-stay-home-order-trump/2880695001/. 
 184. See N.Y. Exec. Order, Executive Order 202.28, Continuing Temporary Suspension and 
Modification of Laws Relating to the Disaster Emergency, by N.Y. Governor Andrew Cuomo 
(Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/no-20228-continuing-temporary-suspension-
and-modification-laws-relating-disaster-emergency. 
 185. Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 
(2020). 
 186. Leon LaBrecque, The CARES Act Has Passed: Here Are the Highlights, FORBES (Mar. 29, 
2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/leonlabrecque/2020/03/29/the-cares-act-has-
passed-here-are-the-highlights/#67757e8768cd; Zack Friedman, Your Student Loans Are Due 
January 1, FORBES (Nov. 10, 2020, 2:45 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackfriedman/2020/
11/10/your-student-loans-are-due-january-1-here-are-5-potential-scenarios/?sh=597a56423ec3. 
 187. LaBrecque, supra note 186. 
 188. See Andy Puzder, Despite the Rocky Publicity, the Small-Business Loan Program Is Really 
Working, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2020, 2:38 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/des
pite-the-rocky-publicity-the-small-business-loan-program-is-really-
working/2020/04/30/970357ce-8b0e-11ea-9dfd-990f9dcc71fc_story.html (“On April 3, the Small 
Business Administration launched the PPP with $349 billion. The SBA’s most recent report says 
that through April 16, the agency approved nearly 1.7 million loans through 4,975 lenders, 
depleting the entire fund.”). The Trump Administration also limited evictions for residential 
tenants. Kelly Anne Smith & Lisa Rowan, Trump’s Eviction Moratorium Aims to Protect Renters, 
but Evictions Continue, FORBES (Sept. 14, 2020, 4:54 PM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/pers
onal-finance/trumps-eviction-moratorium-aims-to-protect-renters-but-evictions-continue/. 
 189. See Fact Sheet, COVID-19 Relief Programs for Businesses and Employers, by Paul, 
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, LLP (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.paulweiss.com/media/3
979787/covid-19-relief-programs-for-businesses-and-employers.pdf; Dan Keating & Lauren 
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that limited evictions, many renters still face eviction, and the eviction 
prohibitions are time limited, which may be little help to many small 
businesses who were shut during the pandemic.190 
VI.  MOVING FORWARD: ADVANCING DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND THE 
ARMSTRONG PRINCIPLE 
Takings law is woefully inadequate to compensate individuals 
who were harmed by the various government shutdowns during the 
coronavirus pandemic—particularly those whose businesses will have 
to close permanently due to the shutdown because they are in a 
particular class of enterprise that concerns gatherings or close contact, 
like hair salons and dine-in restaurants. The plain language of the Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause (“nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation”191)—and the admonition in 
Armstrong: “The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property 
shall not be taken for a public use without just compensation was 
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear 
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole”192—should militate in favor of relief for these 
disproportionately affected individuals and businesses. 
The Armstrong Principle is rooted in fundamental historic notions 
of fairness and justice.193 This is a central concern of moral 
philosophy—“when do the needs of the many outweigh the needs of 
the few?“194 For Aristotle in particular, this was “distributive justice” 
 
Tierney, Which States Are Doing a Better Job Protecting Renters from Being Evicted During the 
Coronavirus Pandemic, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2
020/04/29/which-states-are-doing-better-job-protecting-renters-being-evicted-during-coronavirus-
pandemic/?arc404=true; see also Matthew Haag & Conor Dougherty, #CancelRent Is New Rallying 
Cry for Tenants. Landlords Are Alarmed., N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/05/01/nyregion/rent-strike-coronavirus.html. But see Emily L. Mahoney, Home Renters 
Can’t Get Evicted in Florida, but Small Businesses Can, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Apr. 8, 2020), 
https://www.tampabay.com/news/business/2020/04/08/home-renters-cant-get-evicted-in-florida-
but-small-businesses-can/ (“Florida’s statewide moratorium on evictions doesn’t include 
businesses. Gov. Ron DeSantis’ order, issued April 2, states that he is suspending the law for 
evictions ‘solely as it relates to non-payment of rent by residential tenants due to the COVID-19 
emergency.’ The suspension lasts for 45 days.”). 
 190. Keating & Tierney, supra note 189. 
 191. U.S. CONST. amend V. 
 192. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 193. Jeffrey M. Gaba, Taking “Justice and Fairness” Seriously: Distributive Justice and the 
Takings Clause, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 569, 570 (2007). 
 194. Id. (stating that the issue has “captured the attention of philosophers from Aristotle to Star 
Trek’s Mr. Spock”) (citing STAR TREK II: THE WRATH OF KHAN (Paramount Pictures 1982)). 
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or the “ethical analysis of the distribution of benefits and burdens in 
society.”195 “[D]istributive justice” is the restoration of proportionate 
equality.196 Goods that determine one’s fortune—like money to pay 
rent and employees—that are in limited supply should be distributed 
equally.197 In Aristotle’s words: “[Distributive] justice . . . is that 
which is manifested in distributions of honor or money or the other 
things that fall to be divided among those who have a share in the 
constitution [civil society] . . . .”198 Aristotle scholars have further 
explained that: 
The practical effects of distributive justice are considered to 
be social solidarity and social stability. Hence, society 
allocates goods according to that social rule that best 
effectuates the basic purposes of the polity. In this sense, 
Aristotle’s conception of distributive justice would be 
welfare maximizing. The definitive test of a “just” allocative 
rule is that its resulting allocations are proportionate to a 
primary social value.199 
In this regard, forcing segments of society—like restaurants and 
bars—to shoulder the burdens of society interferes with social stability 
and fails to effectuate the best interests of society. 
Applying Aristotle’s notion of “distributive justice” (and the 
Armstrong Principle) is notoriously difficult generally, but 
particularly so in the coronavirus shutdown of small business context. 
Courts are ill suited to determine the complex notions of which groups 
 
 195. Id. (“In Aristotelian terms, this is the issue of ‘distributive justice’ or the ethical analysis 
of the distribution of benefits and burdens in society.”). 
 196. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. IV, at ch. 4 (William David Ross trans., Oxford, 
The Clarendon Press 1908) (c. 384 B.C.E.) (ebook); cf. James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public 
Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 859, 859(arguing that justice would be served through increased 
compensation in eminent domain cases when there is little evidence of public use). 
 197. See Dana Neaçsu, A Brief Critique of the Emaciated State and Its Reliance on Non-
Governmental Organizations to Provide Social Services, 9 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 405, 418 (2006); 
Kathryn Heidt, Corrective Justice from Aristotle to Second Order Liability: Who Should Pay When 
the Culpable Cannot?, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347, 351 (1990) (“The aim of distributive justice 
is to establish or provide a method of establishing a proportion according to which the members of 
society will share so that the most deserving will be entitled to the most, and the least deserving to 
the least.”). 
 198. ARISTOTLE, supra note 196, bk. V, at ch. 2; cf. Judith A. Swanson, Michael J. Sandel’s 
Justice: What’s the Right Thing to Do? A Response of Moral Reasoning in Kind, With Analysis of 
Aristotle and Examples, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1375, 1385 (2011) (“As Aristotle says, doing the right 
thing requires doing it at the right time, in the right way, to the right people . . . .”). 
 199. Elbert L. Robertson, A Corrective Justice Theory of Antitrust Regulation, CATH. U. L. 
REV. 741, 743–44 (2000). 
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should pay a “fair share” or “equal distribution” in fighting the 
coronavirus.200 The government shutdown during the coronavirus 
pandemic unquestionably represents an exercise of the government’s 
police power to regulate the health, safety, and welfare of the 
community. But the three-part Penn Central Test does not adequately 
account for equal distribution of burdens. 
Yet the Armstrong Principle is the ostensible impetus for the 
three-part Penn Central Test: 
The question of what constitutes a “taking” for purposes of 
the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of 
considerable difficulty. While this Court has recognized that 
the “Fifth Amendment’s guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne 
by the public as a whole,” [citing Armstrong], this Court, 
quite simply, has been unable to develop any “set formula” 
for determining when “justice and fairness” require that 
economic injuries caused by public action be compensated 
by the government, rather than remain disproportionately 
concentrated on a few persons [citing Goldblatt]. Indeed, we 
have frequently observed that whether a particular restriction 
will be rendered invalid by the government’s failure to pay 
for any losses proximately caused by it depends largely 
“upon the particular circumstances [in that] case. 
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the 
Court’s decisions have identified several factors that have 
particular significance. The economic impact of the 
regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to 
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. 
So, too, is the character of the governmental action. A 
 
 200. See Huntington Beach City Council v. Superior Ct., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439, 452 (Ct. App. 
2002) (“You can get a Ph.D. in political science studying what ‘fair shares’ are and still not come 
to any firm conclusion. The subject has occupied political philosophers since at least Aristotle, 
who, in addressing the subject of ‘distributive justice,’ began a long tradition in political philosophy 
of thinking about exactly what do you mean by ‘fair’ in ‘fair share.’ It is one of those topics that is 
particularly suited for the marketplace of ideas.”); see also Gaba, supra note 193, at 575 (“[T]he 
Supreme Court has never seriously explored the implications of viewing the Takings Clause in 
terms of distributive justice. Indeed, the Court seems to have shied away from any serious 
analysis.”). 
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“taking” may more readily be found when the interference 
with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by 
government, than when interference arises from some public 
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life 
to promote the common good.201 
Any “set formula”202 for determining whether “justice and fairness” 
dictate that a business owner should be compensated because their 
property has been “taken” should include an express recitation of the 
Armstrong Principle as a determinative fourth Penn Central factor 
when one group has been called upon to bear burdens that should be 
borne by society as a whole.203 As a practical matter, the Armstrong 
Principle is repeatedly cited by courts, but is practically never a 
determinative factor in deciding whether, for example, a Fifth 
Amendment taking has occurred.204 It should be.205 The coronavirus 
 
 201. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978) (first and fourth 
alterations in original)  (emphasis added) (citations omitted); cf. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003, 1071 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (“[T]he determination whether a law effects a taking is 
ultimately a matter of ‘fairness and justice,’ [citing Armstrong] and ‘necessarily requires a weighing 
of private and public interests’ [citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980)].  The 
rigid rules fixed by the Court today clash with this enterprise: ‘fairness and justice’ are often 
disserved by categorical rules.”). 
 202. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 124. Although Penn Central refers to a “set formula,” “no 
magic formula enables a court to judge, in every case, whether a given government interference 
with property is a taking.” Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 31 (2012). 
 203. See contra Michael Pappas, The Armstrong Revolution, 76 MD. L. REV. ENDNOTES 35, 45 
(2016) (stating that the Armstrong Principle “cannot serve as a meaningful test to determine 
whether property has been taken”). According to Pappas, “the inquiry as to whether a taking has, 
in fact, occurred should incorporate no comparative fairness question. It should merely ask whether 
regulation has gone too far in reducing property expectations.” Id. 
 204. See id. at 43–44 ([A]n analysis of all citations to the Armstrong principle in lower federal 
courts and state courts indicates the same result: that the Armstrong principle is oft-cited but never 
the ultimate grounds for resolving a case. These cases citing Armstrong tend to fall into one of four 
categories. First, some cases simply cite and repeat the Armstrong principle, usually as a general 
tenet of takings law. Second, some cases cite the Armstrong principle as a component of one of the 
factors in the Penn Central balancing test or cite Armstrong as an addition after applying an 
individualist takings measure. Third, some cases cite Armstrong in reliance on its narrow holding 
to support the assertion that liens or comparable types of property amount to property interests for 
the purposes of the takings clause. Finally, a fourth set of cases cites Armstrong for the general 
propositions that the destruction or seizure of valuable property can amount to a taking but that not 
every government action affecting property is necessarily a taking. There are also cases that fall 
outside of these categories, but, again, none applies Armstrong as the primary (or even major) 
source of reasoning or decision in a case. Of all these cases, none of them offers a robust or even 
meaningful application of the Armstrong principle as a test for whether a taking has occurred.); cf. 
Stephen Durden, Unprincipled Principles: The Takings Clause Exemplar, 3 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. 
REV. 25, 45 (2013) (stating that the Supreme Court embraces Armstrong “at least occasionally”). 
 205. “[T]he Supreme Court has never seriously explored the implications of viewing the 
Takings Clause in terms of distributive justice.” Gaba, supra note 193, at 575. Rather, “the Court 
seems to have shied away from any serious analysis,” and continues to “resort[] to the same ad hoc 
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shutdowns have exposed a glaring inadequacy in the way takings 
claims are evaluated. 
Employing the new and expanded test will not, by any means, 
open the floodgates of compensation for aggrieved property and 
business owners, nor unfortunately, will it directly help those who 
have lost their jobs due to the coronavirus pandemic shutdown. It may 
extend the possibility of a decision that considers distributive justice 
in determining whether a property interest has been “taken,” in 
instances where there is a glaring inequity in distributive justice.206 
This is particularly true, in the “category of cases in which . . . . 
unanticipated regulations destroy a significant portion of the total 
assets of a property owner.”207 In many situations, the coronavirus 
pandemic government shutdown of small businesses that depend on 
“social distancing” is just such a category of cases. 
Expanding takings law by adding a determinative factor to the 
Penn Central Test for unexpected catastrophic regulations will better 
allow those affected to be heard. The static three-part Penn Central 
Test does not achieve this goal because it does not expressly balance 
societal interests. Since the Penn Central Test represents the 
touchstone of nearly all takings analyses, courts would be better 
equipped to make just decisions with an expanded and flexible test—
as was originally contemplated in Penn Central.208 This is particularly 
true in the context of the additional burden created by the temporary 
takings analysis. Petitioners have the high hurdle of showing that a 
 
balancing.” Id. (noting how, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the Supreme Court merely stated that 
the outcome “depends largely ‘upon the particular circumstances’” of the case). 
 206. See, e.g., id. at 590 (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court would have reached a different 
result in Miller v. Schoene if the Court had considered “fairness” in deciding whether a taking had 
occurred (citing Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280–81 (1928))). Of course, Miller was decided 
decades before both Armstrong and Penn Central. 
 207. William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narrative of Takings, and 
Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151, 1155 (1997). Treanor persuasively argues 
that compensation in cases where “the total net worth of a property owner is dealt a disproportionate 
blow as a result of a newly instituted government regulation.” Id. at 1156; cf. Sanitation & 
Recycling Indus. Inc. v. City of New York, 107 F.3d 985, 993 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Impairment is 
greatest where the challenged government legislation was wholly unexpected.”). 
 208. Cf. Nestor M. Davidson, The Problem of Equality in Takings, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 6–8 
(2008) (“There is a strong meta-signal in the Court’s endorsement of Penn Central as the lodestar 
of regulatory takings jurisprudence, with its concomitant rejection of rule-based limits on the 
government’s ability to redefine property rights. Privileging ad hoc, open-ended analysis commits 
the Court—to the consternation of some commentators—to unfolding the doctrine in a pragmatic 
common law manner. The Court’s embrace of Justice Brennan’s jurisprudential shrug of the 
shoulders in Penn Central does not quite amount to Justice Stewart’s famous I-know-it-when-I-
see-it standard, but it certainly comes close.”). 
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law is arbitrary or otherwise interfered with a fundamental right—or 
having government end a regulation after a taking has occurred—then 
would have to meet the Penn Central Test to obtain “just 
compensation” for a taking.209 There should be an exception to this 
procedure in the highly unusual situation of when there is a 
disproportionately applied, unanticipated and sudden catastrophic 
change in the law that destroys nearly all of a property owner’s 
holdings—like during a global pandemic and the ensuing “social 
distancing” regulations. 
Under current law, it is highly unlikely that a petitioner would be 
able to get around the health and safety exceptions and/or prove that 
the coronavirus government shutdown regulation was otherwise 
invalid, or ended after a taking occurred (effecting a temporary 
taking), but if so, an aggrieved party may still have a viable Penn 
Central argument.210 Under Penn Central, the petitioner would first 
have to show interference with reasonable investment-backed 
expectations. Here, many impacted businesses certainly expected to 
be able to continue their businesses in March and April of 2020 
without their governors closing their doors due to a global 
pandemic.211 There is a demonstrable interference with investment 
backed expectations. Next, the petitioner would have to show a 
diminution in value. Again, this should not be a problem. Appraisers 
can quantify the losses from a business closure or other loss 
occasioned by the government shutdown.212 The character of the 
 
 209. In such a case, a petitioner might also have a right to compensation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(2012) (civil action for deprivation of rights). Section 1983 gives individuals the right to sue state 
actors for civil rights or other constitutional violations, including impairment of contract. Id. 
 210. But see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421–23, 441 
(1982) (holding that a New York state law preventing landlords from collecting fees for cable 
installations on their properties was a taking under the Fifth Amendment). 
 211. See, e.g., TJM 64, Inc. v. Harris, 475 F. Supp. 3d 828, 837–38 (W.D. Tenn. 2020). In TJM 
64, a federal district court considered whether to grant an injunction and weighed the Penn Central 
factors in determining whether the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim. 
The court found that the “[COVID-19 closure Orders] interfere in a significant way with Plaintiffs’ 
investment-backed expectations in their properties, despite their status as highly regulated entities.” 
Id. at 839. The court also found a diminution in value, but ultimately denied the plaintiffs’ motion 
based on Penn Central’s character of the government action test. Id.; see also Elmsford Apt. 
Assocs., LLC v. Cuomo, 469 F. Supp. 3d 348, at 155 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (denying a motion for 
summary judgment challenging New York’s temporary ban on eviction proceedings under, inter 
alia, a takings theory). Under Elmsford, the court found that the petitioners could not reasonably 
expect to be free of additional rental regulations like the eviction ban. Id. at 168–69. The court also 
found that the character of the government action prong weighed in favor of the defendant because 
it was a temporary reallocation of resources. Id. at 167–68. 
 212. See, e.g., Elmsford., 469 F. Supp. 3d at 166–68. 
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government action may be a problem when a shutdown is due to health 
and safety concerns,213 but the actual action—and how it relates to 
those burdens—will depend on the circumstances of the case. Finally, 
petitioner should be able to show that they have been singled out to 
bear a burden that should be borne as a whole—depending on the size 
of the affected population. 
In the case of an unanticipated regulation that destroys a 
significant portion of a property owner’s assets—and the petitioner 
carries a disproportionate burden—there should be a more colorable 
Fifth Amendment takings argument—even if the regulation is 
temporarily related to a health and safety violation. This should be a 
high bar for unprecedented situations that single out particular types 
of property owners, whose interests are devastated by the 
unanticipated regulation,214 and whose burdens are disproportionate to 
the rest of society. The principles of distributive justice call for no less. 
Therefore, despite the unquestionably compelling safety and health 
concerns militating in favor of shutting down businesses that center 
upon social distancing, these industries should not be forced to bear 
the brunt of society’s burdens, while other industries flourish215 during 
the coronavirus pandemic. 
This raises the question of where to draw the line in determining 
whether one group is called upon to sacrifice for the greater good. 
Distributive justice cannot be absolute in this context. Armstrong’s 
reflection of the principle of distributive justice is clear (as is the plain 
language of the Fifth Amendment), yet the U.S. Supreme Court has 
 
 213. Id. at 167–69. See Lebanon Valley Auto Racing Corp. v. Cuomo, 478 F. Supp. 3d 389, 
402 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (“[W]ith respect to the third factor—the character of the government action—
the Court begins by noting its power to outweigh the other two.”). 
 214. See Gaba, supra note 193, at 586–87. Professor Gaba posits an “insurance theory” of 
sharing the risk to minimize loss in a takings context. According to Professor Gaba, “insurance is 
appropriately employed only to avoid catastrophic loss from unusual and unpredictable events. 
Insurance theory indicates that we should not buy insurance to cover relatively small losses that 
arise from regular and expected events; it is economically more rational to bear such losses 
ourselves.” Id. 
 215. See Big Tech’s Covid-19 Opportunity, THE ECONOMIST (Apr. 4, 2020) 
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/04/04/big-techs-covid-19-opportunity (“The pandemic 
will have many losers, but it already has one clear winner: big tech. The large digital platforms, 
including Alphabet and Facebook, will come out of the crisis even stronger. They should use this 
good fortune to reset their sometimes testy relations with their users. Otherwise big government, 
the other beneficiary of the covid calamity, is likely to do it for them.”); Jeremy Kress, Big Banks 
Are Growing Due to the Coronavirus—That’s an Ominous Sign, THE HILL (May 1, 2020, 7:30 
PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/495719-big-banks-are-growing-due-to-coronavirus-
thats-an-ominous-sign. 
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justifiably limited just compensation in areas where the government 
exercises its police power to protect the health safety and welfare of 
its residents. According to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
“[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to 
property could not be diminished without paying for every such 
change in the general law.”216 The population, therefore, of affected 
individuals entitled to compensation cannot be so large that it 
interferes with government’s ability to go on. 
Permitting widespread takings for coronavirus pandemic 
shutdowns may also incentivize businesses to engage in risky behavior 
by remaining open to get shut down by the government and 
subsequently receive compensation. Even if this strategy were 
successful, the government would still retain the ability to shut down 
businesses, it would just have to pay “just compensation” for doing 
so.217 This is, after all, the touchstone of the Fifth Amendment’s plain 
language. 
Zoning changes, and health and safety regulations practically 
always affect one’s use of property and therefore reduce the value of 
property.218 There is also no question that the government shutdown 
to avert a global pandemic represents a legitimate—even a 
compelling—public interest. The critical question in determining 
compensation lies in “distributive justice,” which should be reflected 
in an overriding—and determinative—factor in the Penn Central 
Test219 in cases where regulations are disproportionately applied, 
unanticipated, catastrophic, and sudden—and “destroy a significant 
portion of the [property owner’s assets].”220 This approach is 
consistent with Armstrong and the ostensible impetus for the Penn 
Central Test itself. 
 
 216. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
 217. See Ilya Somin, Does the Takings Clause Require Compensation for Coronavirus 
Shutdowns?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 20, 2020, 10:20 PM), https://reason.com/2020/03/20/d
oes-the-takings-clause-require-compensation-for-coronavirus-shutdowns/. 
 218. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 334–
35 (2002) (“[A deprivation of all economic use cannot always be a taking because it] would apply 
to numerous ‘normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinance, variances 
and the like’ . . . as well as to orders temporarily prohibiting access to crime scenes, businesses that 
violate health codes, fire damaged buildings or other areas we cannot foresee.”). 
 219. Cf. Treanor, supra note 207, at 1155 (stating that cases in which “unanticipated regulations 
destroy a significant portion of the total assets of a property owner” require compensation under 
the Armstrong Principle). 
 220. Id. 
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Therefore, there should be two exceptions to this test: (1) when 
the subject regulation is mitigating a harm caused by the property 
itself; and (2) when the population of similarly affected parties is too 
large to constitute a legitimate claim of being “singled out” for 
carrying a burden that should be shouldered by society as a whole. 
First, there should be no taking for a property that is directly 
causing a situation that calls for a sudden and unanticipated regulation. 
This exception is analogous to the “background principles” exception 
in Lucas. According to Lucas: 
[T]he owner of a lake-bed, for example, would not be entitled 
to compensation when he is denied the requisite permit to 
engage in a landfilling operation that would have the effect 
of flooding others’ land. Nor the corporate owner of a 
nuclear generating plant, when it is directed to remove all 
improvements from its land upon discovery that the plant sits 
astride an earthquake fault. Such regulatory action may well 
have the effect of eliminating the land’s only economically 
productive use, but it does not proscribe a productive use that 
was previously permissible under relevant property and 
nuisance principles.221 
In this regard, properties that cause the harm that the sudden regulation 
is enacted to protect is akin to a nuisance that does not otherwise 
deserve protection222 because it is recognized as a harm to society. In 
the coronavirus shutdown context, many petitioners have argued that 
their offending regulations have little bearing on reducing the 
transmission of disease. Such claimants should have an opportunity to 
have their interests balanced in a takings test before a court. 
Second, the population of affected parties entitled to 
compensation from a sudden unanticipated and catastrophic regulation 
that results in a near total loss of property must be identifiable, 
sufficiently narrow, and with nearly similar impacts. To the extent that 
a sudden, catastrophic and unexpected regulation wipes out too many 
property owners’ values, the relief is no less just, but at that point, 
Fifth Amendment takings law—and the Armstrong principle—are not 
suited to provide compensation. At some point, the relief is legislative, 
 
 221. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029–30 (1992). 
 222. See Gaba, supra note 193, at 587–88 (discussing “blameworthiness” in assessing the 
validity of a takings claim). 
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not judicial, and appeals should be to legislators, not to judges.223 
Florida, for example has a statute that mirrors the Armstrong principle. 
Under the Bert J. Harris Private Property Rights Protection Act, 
compensation is due for regulations that “inordinately burden, restrict, 
or limit private property rights.”224 Under that law, a property is 
inordinately burdened when a property owner “bears permanently a 
disproportionate share of a burden imposed for the good of the public, 
which in fairness should be borne by the public at large.”225 However, 
an “inordinate burden” does not include temporary impacts, or 
remediation of a public nuisance.226 Therefore, an aggrieved property 
owner, whose business was shut down by a pandemic regulation 
probably has no cause of action under this statute—but it’s a close 
model of a legislative fix. The Florida legislature could, for example, 
add a clause stating that temporary impacts may be considered for a 
taking if the regulations are (1) disproportionately applied; (2) 
catastrophic; and (3) unexpected. 
Because of these necessary exceptions, the procedures outlined in 
this Article will not likely dramatically change the landscape of Fifth 
Amendment takings law. State and local governments still have 
sweeping power to regulate for the public health, safety, and welfare.  
The coronavirus pandemic shutdown is a valid exercise of that power. 
The point rather is to focus the shift of the analysis to the benefits and 
burdens of regulations that severely harm property interests that are 
called upon to shoulder burdens that should be borne by society—in 
situations involving a disproportionate, catastrophic and unexpected 
loss. Takings law, as currently applied does not adequately reflect 
distributive justice or the Armstrong Principle. 
Another problem with this approach is that it does little to assist 
front-line workers who have been hardest hit by pandemic-initiated 
government shutdowns. Those individuals are shouldering 
disproportionate burdens (job losses) while other segments of society 
 
 223. See, e.g., Treanor, supra note 207, at 1174 (suggesting a compensation statute that tracks, 
in part, the Armstrong Principle). The North Carolina legislature proposed a bill that would amend 
the state Constitution to allow a business to sue the government when partially or completely closed 
by the Governor’s executive order. Richard Craver, N.C., House Bill Would Allow Business Owners 
to Sue Over Shutdowns, WINSTON-SALEM J. (May 27, 2020) https://journalnow.com/news/state/n-
c-house-bill-would-allow-business-owners-to-sue-over-shutdowns/article_a2e16a14-2518-5ec2-
9ef3-6264f82e0c19.html. 
 224. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001 (LexisNexis 2021). 
 225. Id. § 70.001(e)(1). 
 226. Id. § 70.001(e)(1)–(2). 
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are thriving. The Fifth Amendment takings analysis does little to make 
these workers whole, although the expanded analysis suggested here, 
taking into account the Armstrong Principle, may dissuade state and 
local authorities from closing certain businesses in the first place 
which may preserve jobs. Relief for workers and other segments of 
society that have been disproportionately burdened otherwise lies with 
state and federal legislatures.227 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The harm to many small businesses—and their employees—
during the coronavirus government shutdown was widespread, and 
frequently catastrophic. Restaurants, gyms, retail, and the travel 
industry were particularly devastated, and workers in these industries 
may be the least financially able to weather the pandemic’s economic 
storm.228 
Unfortunately, absent a showing of arbitrary government action 
or a physical invasion, those hardest hit will not be able to receive 
compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
despite the fact that their livelihood may have been taken (at least 
temporarily) without just compensation from the government. This is 
true despite the Supreme Court’s admonition in Armstrong and 
Aristotle’s concept of distributive justice. Takings Clause 
jurisprudence is therefore inadequate to fully compensate individuals 
whose property has been “taken” without just compensation. Adding 
a determinative factor to the Penn Central Test for situations that are 
disproportionate, sudden, and catastrophic may help advance the 
interests of those who are bearing more of a burden than should 
justifiably be borne by society as a whole. 
 
 
 227. Affected workers may also have a narrow constitutional argument. According to the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals, “[t]he right to hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen 
profession free from unreasonable governmental interference comes within both the ‘liberty’ and 
the ‘property’ concepts of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 
F.3d 1250, 1259 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492, (1959)). However, 
“it is the liberty to pursue a calling or occupation, and not the right to a specific job, that is secured 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 228. See, e.g., Grant Suneson, Industries Hit Hardest by Coronavirus in the US Include Retail, 
Transportation, and Travel, USA TODAY (Mar. 20, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/s
tory/money/2020/03/20/us-industries-being-devastated-by-the-coronavirus-travel-hotels-
food/111431804/ (“[H]ourly workers in sectors like hospitality and retail may be let go as their 
companies get less business. This further jeopardizes some of the least financially secure workers 
in the country—jobs in these fields are often part-time and typically pay low wages.”). 
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